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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 16, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit handed down its decision in United States v. Hayes (the
“Hayes Appeal”).1 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit became the lone
circuit, splitting from nine others, in its interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), it is a crime for any individual with a
misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence (“MCDV”) to possess,
ship, or transport a firearm that has traveled in or affected interstate
commerce. In the Hayes Appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the
predicate offense of an MCDV must have as an element a domestic
relationship.2 All nine other circuits to address this issue, however, have
ruled to the contrary, holding that the MCDV need only have the element
of force and that the relationship between the parties can be established
using evidence beyond the elements of the underlying offense.3 It is this
process of proving the existence of a predicate offense—permitted by at
least nine circuits—that this Article will explore in detail.
This Article will show that allowing predicate offenses to be proven
using evidence outside the judicial record of a prior conviction has the
potential to invoke a variety of constitutional concerns, including the
Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial, the Tenth Amendment’s
protection of states’ rights, and, most significantly, the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy. It is the goal of this
Article to shed light on the most significant of these concerns. The
Article establishes that proving the existence of a predicate offense with
evidence outside the judicial record of a prior conviction, if permitted,
must be subject to a double jeopardy analysis in order to protect a
1

United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W.
3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608) (holding that the text, structure, and legislative
history of the law, and the rule of lenity, mandated that the statute be read to require that
the MCDV have a domestic relationship as an element).
2
Id. at 759.
3
See United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 (10th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Dep’t of Justice, 328
F.3d 1361, 1364–67 (Fed. Cir. 2003); United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, 562 (5th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Barnes, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 87, 295 F.3d 1354, 1358–61
(D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 142–44 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218–21 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619–
21 (8th Cir. 1999).
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defendant’s constitutional rights. Because the statute and facts
surrounding the Hayes case create the potential for double jeopardy
concerns in the context of proving a predicate offense, this Article will
explore the issue under those circumstances.
The use of double jeopardy analysis in this context has never been
substantively addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States or
any other federal court. Therefore, this Article provides a fresh look at
the double jeopardy issue that arises when proving the existence of a
predicate offense. This Article contends that allowing the prosecution to
present new evidence outside the record of the prior conviction in Hayes
would have violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy.4 This contention is reached by examining the
circumstances in Hayes under the Supreme Court’s current double
jeopardy analysis.5 In doing so, the Article concludes that any attempt by
the federal government to use evidence outside the judicial record of a
prior conviction in order to prove the existence of a predicate offense
must be subject to double jeopardy analysis.6
Section II of the Article provides a background to lay the framework for the issues raised by proving predicate offenses as substantive
elements of a federal charge at the guilt phase of a prosecution. Because
of the limited case law on permissible evidence for proving predicate
offenses at the guilt phase, this section will first discuss Supreme Court
decisions involving such evidence at the sentencing phase of a criminal
prosecution.7 It will then discuss how the logic used at the sentencing
phase carries over to the context of proving predicate offenses at the guilt
phase. This section also provides background on United States v. Hayes
(“Hayes”), a decision where the district court applied the Supreme
Court’s sentencing phase analysis to the guilt phase of a prosecution.8
Finally, this section reveals how the circumstances of proving predicate
offenses at the guilt phase with evidence outside the judicial record of the
prior conviction raises the issue of double jeopardy.
In Section III, the Article explores a detailed analysis of the double
jeopardy issue that arises from proving a predicate offense at the guilt
phase of a prosecution with evidence that is not judicially noticeable
because it is outside the judicial record of the prior conviction. First, this
section recounts applicable Supreme Court precedent and the competing
4
5
6
7
8

See infra Section III.a.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section II.a.
377 F. Supp. 2d 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005).
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theories surrounding double jeopardy analysis. Second, the section
explains the doctrine of dual sovereignty and why it does not preclude
the application of double jeopardy analysis in the predicate offense
context. The discussion then applies double jeopardy analysis in the
context of the Hayes decision in order to exemplify the double jeopardy
concerns associated with proving predicate offenses generally. In doing
so, this section concludes that a double jeopardy analysis will always be
necessary to determine the constitutionality of proving the existence of a
predicate offense that cannot be recognized through judicial notice.
Section IV provides a brief synopsis of other constitutional
concerns that are likely to arise if a trial court admits evidence of a prior
conviction outside that which is in the judicial record of the prior
conviction. Specifically, it addresses the defendant’s right to a speedy
trial under the Sixth Amendment and the issue of state sovereignty under
the Tenth Amendment.
Finally, Section V concludes the Article by describing the
expectation of what the future may hold with regard to proving the
existence of a predicate offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution.
II. PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND THEIR JUDICIAL RECORDS
A. Introduction
Before delving into the double jeopardy analysis of this Article, it is
important to set forth a backdrop for the topic and the issue of proving
predicate offenses generally.
In recent years, Congress has passed various laws that incorporate a
defendant’s prior state convictions into federal statutes.9 Most frequently,
the prior convictions are incorporated for the purposes of sentencing
enhancements and as substantive elements of federal crimes. Moreover,
much of the controversy regarding the use of these predicate offenses
relates to what evidence may be used to prove that the underlying
conviction qualifies as the conviction required by the incorporating
statute. Due to the relatively recent implementation of such statutes,
however, there is almost no case law addressing what evidence the
federal government may use to prove the existence of a predicate offense
at the guilt phase of a prosecution.
The Supreme Court, however, has addressed the similar issue of
permissible evidence for proving predicate offenses at the sentencing

9

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2000).
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phase of a criminal prosecution.10 In that context, the Supreme Court
held that, when proving the existence of a predicate offense, the
government may not present evidence outside the judicial record of a
prior conviction due to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial
by jury.11 This holding is particularly relevant because the extension of
its rationale to the guilt phase of a prosecution is what potentially triggers
the double jeopardy concerns addressed by this Article.12 Thus, this
section will explore that precedent and how it has been utilized in the
context of proving the existence of a predicate offense at the guilt phase
of a federal prosecution.
B. Prior Convictions and Sentencing Enhancements
In Taylor v. United States13 and Shepard v. United States,14 the
Supreme Court addressed the scope of evidence that may be used by the
federal government to prove the existence of a predicate offense for
sentencing enhancement purposes.15
Taylor and Shepard involved the definition of burglary as a
predicate offense for sentence enhancement purposes under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).16 As defined by the Court, the federal
statute created a generic predicate offense of burglary that included any
offense having the “basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry
into, or remaining in, a building or structure with intent to commit a
crime.”17 In both cases the defendant had been convicted under a more
broadly defined burglary statute that was not limited to entries into
buildings or structures.18 Consequently, the Court had to determine what
evidence should be admitted to determine if the building or structure
element of the predicate offense had been met.19

10

See infra Section II.a.
Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005); see infra II.a.
12
United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
13
495 U.S. 575 (1990).
14
125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005).
15
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 575; Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1254 (extending the holding in
Taylor to guilty pleas).
16
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 577; Shepard, 125 S.Ct. 1257 (2005); see also 18 U.S.C. §
924(e) (2000).
17
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599.
18
Id.; Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257.
19
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599; Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257.
11
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In Taylor20 and Shepard,21 the Supreme Court held that, in order to
protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, the
prosecution was limited to the judicially noticeable facts of the prior
conviction. In explaining its rationale, the Shepard Court noted that
“respect for congressional intent and avoidance of collateral trials require
that evidence of a generic conviction be confined to records of the
convicting court approaching the certainty of the record of conviction . . .
.”22 The Court further explained the controlling doctrine from Taylor by
stating that it prohibited the admission of evidence not introduced at trial,
even if that evidence was “uncontradicted” and “internally consistent”
with the evidence that was admitted.23
In Shepard, the Court noted that using information outside the
record of the prior offense to establish the existence of the predicate
offense would require the sentencing judge to make a disputed finding of
fact.24 The Court held that the Apprendi line of decisions and the Sixth
Amendment prohibited any such finding because those decisions
“guarantee a jury’s finding of any disputed fact essential to increase the
ceiling of a potential sentence.”25 As a result, the sentencing court was
not allowed to look to any evidence outside the judicial record in order to
recognize the existence of the predicate offense.26

20

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02 (the ACCA “mandates a formal categorical approach,
looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular
facts underlying those convictions[,]” and this “categorical approach . . . may permit the
sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases
where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of the generic [offense]”).
21
Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1263 (holding that “enquiry under the ACCA to determine
whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted
elements of the generic offense is limited to the terms of the charging document, the
terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which
the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable
judicial record of this information”).
22
Id. at 1261.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1262.
25
Id.; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt). Many commentators have even advocated that this logic should result
in predicate offenses having to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing
phase of litigation. See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal
Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 296 (2005). The Supreme Court did
not, however, feel such a step was necessary. Rather, the Court found that limiting
judicial notice to that of the judicial record was sufficient to protect the defendant’s
constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment.
26
Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1262.
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Neither Taylor nor Shepard discussed the applicability of their
holdings at the guilt phase of a prosecution.27 Those decisions are
pertinent to this Article, however, because lower federal courts have
extended their application to that context.
C. Predicate Offenses as Substantive Elements to a Criminal Charge
In the only two federal cases to address whether the Shepard
analysis applies to predicate offenses as substantive elements at the guilt
phase of a prosecution, the courts held that it does.28 Moreover, in United
States v. Hayes, the more detailed of those opinions, the district court
found that the Shepard standard is met as long as the facts are proven to
a jury, even if they are proven at a proceeding subsequent to the prior
conviction.29
The first federal decision to discuss the application of Shepard at
the guilt phase of a prosecution was United States v. Nobriga, a May
2005 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.30 In Nobriga, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that Taylor and
Shepard were applicable at the guilt phase, and therefore limited the
scope of evidence that could be used to prove the existence of the
requisite predicate offense.31 Though the opinion was later withdrawn as
being moot, it still represents a recognition that the Shepard analysis may
apply outside the context of the ACCA sentencing enhancements.32
Similarly, in June 2005, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia issued an opinion recognizing
Shepard’s applicability in the context of proving a predicate offense at
the guilt phase of a prosecution.33 In United States v. Hayes, the
government intended to use facts outside the judicial record from a prior
simple battery conviction to prove at trial that the prior state conviction
actually satisfied the federal definition of an MCDV under 18 U.S.C. §
27
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; see also Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1263 (addressing the
dissent’s concern with the possibility of the government presenting evidence outside the
judicial record of a prior conviction to a jury and the resulting prejudice that would
occur).
28
United States v. Nobriga, 408 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2005) (withdrawn, United
States v. Nobriga, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 10 (2006)); United States v. Hayes, 377 F.
Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482
F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07608).
29
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
30
Nobriga, 408 F.3d at 1179.
31
Id. at 1182, n.4.
32
Id. at 1181.
33
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 542.

Comment [A1]: Footnote Numbering
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922(g)(9).34 In Hayes, the district court held that the evidentiary limits of
Shepard applied to judicial fact-finding, and not to finding of facts made
by a jury.35 Therefore, the Shepard standard for limiting evidence to the
judicial record of a guilty plea did not prevent the government from
presenting that evidence to a jury.36 Consequently, the government was
permitted to indict the defendant for illegal possession of a firearm under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) because Shepard did not apply to facts proven to a
jury.37 However, to better understand how the court reached this decision
and what impact its holding ultimately has on double jeopardy, it is
helpful to take a closer look at the circumstances of the case.
D. United States v. Hayes
In 1994, in West Virginia magistrate court, Randy Edward Hayes
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense of simple battery.38 Eleven
years later, on January 4, 2005, Hayes was indicted by a federal grand
jury under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9), 924(a)(2), for illegally possessing a
firearm while having been previously convicted of an MCDV.39 The
circumstances of Hayes’ simple battery conviction are unclear from the
decision; however, Hayes indicated that no judicially recognizable
documentation of his prior conviction revealed the identity of his
victim.40 Hayes argued that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Shepard, the government could not prove the identity of his victim and
thus could not prove that he had a prior conviction for an MCDV as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).41
In Hayes, the district court first outlined the standards for sustaining
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9):
The Government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) that the accused possessed, shipped, or transported a
firearm; (2) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate
34

Id.
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 543.
38
Id. at 540.
39
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000) is the penalty provision for a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(a)(6), (d), (g)–(j), (o) (2000).
40
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
41
Id.; see also Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005) (holding that in the
context of sentence enhancements, the Sixth Amendment requires that a sentencing court
limit itself to examining the statute of conviction, charging document, plea agreement,
plea transcript, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant
assented, when determining whether a prior conviction is a felony for enhancement
purposes).
35
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commerce; and (3) that the accused had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.42

The district court also recognized that a crime of domestic violence
is defined as a misdemeanor with an element including the use or
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon, committed by a person with whom the victim has a domestic
relationship.43 Moreover, citing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Bethurum, the court added that:
[w]hether a predicate offense qualifies as a ‘misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence’ pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) is a
question of law rather than a separate and essential element of a
violation of § 922(g)(9) which must be proved to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.44

The district court, however, additionally discussed the Fourth
Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Ball,45 which, in
accord with other circuits, held that a predicate offense under § 922(g)(9)
only required that the predicate offense have one element—the element
of physical force.46 Ball also held that the prosecution carried the burden
of proving to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a domestic
relationship did in fact exist between the defendant and his victim.47 The
court in Hayes then synthesized the Bethurum and Ball decisions and
held that a judge must only find the element of force in the predicate
offense through judicial notice, and, if it is found, the prosecution is left
to prove the domestic relationship to the jury.48
42

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)(2000); United States v. Bethurum, 343 F.3d 712,
716 (5th Cir. 2003)).
43
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2000) (defining the crime as being: committed by a
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated
with the victim as a spouse, parent or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim).
44
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (citing Bethurum, 343 F.3d at 716–17); see also
United States v. Bethurum, 343 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 2003).
45
United States v. Ball, 7 F. App’x 210 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished), overruled by
United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255
(U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608); see also, infra, Section II.C. (providing further
analysis of the Ball decision).
46
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 541–42 (citing Ball, 7 F. App’x 210); see also United
States v. Rodriguez-Deharo, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (adopting a similar
rationale and following suit with the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits).
47
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (citing White v. Dep’t of Justice, 328 F.3d 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
48
Id.
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In his defense, Hayes argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Shepard controlled what evidence the federal government could use to
prove that his prior guilty plea to simple battery was in fact a prior
conviction for a crime of domestic violence.49 Thus, Hayes maintained
that the evidence permitted for use by the prosecution should be limited
to the “statute of conviction, charging document, plea agreement, plea
transcript and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the
defendant assented.”50
In rendering its decision, the district court first held that the
Shepard analysis was applicable at the guilt phase of a prosecution.51 The
court qualified its holding, however, by indicating that Shepard only
applied to judicial fact-finding and not fact-finding by a jury.52 The court
stated that Shepard did not apply to cases where the evidence outside the
judicial record of the prior conviction would ultimately be proven to a
jury.53 The court reasoned that Shepard did not apply to such cases
because they did not raise constitutional issues regarding a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.54 Therefore, the court held that the
prosecution should be permitted to use evidence outside the judicial
record of Hayes’ prior conviction to prove at trial that the prior
conviction did in fact meet the federal definition of a crime of domestic
violence.55 Consequently, the court denied Hayes’ motion to dismiss the
superseding indictment because it was valid on its face and did not
violate his Sixth Amendment rights under Shepard.56
On appeal of the Hayes decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court’s ruling regarding the appropriate manner for proving the
existence of the predicate offense.57 More specifically, the court of
appeals concluded that the text, structure, and legislative history of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and the rule of lenity required that a domestic
relationship be an explicit element to the predicate offense.58 Though the
49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. (citing United States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834 (4th Cir. 2005) (following
Shepard in the context of an attempt to equate a predicate offense of breaking and
entering to a crime of violence through judicial notice for sentence enhancement
purposes).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 542–43.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 543.
57
United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 750 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
58
Id.
50
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Hayes Appeal effectively nullified the topic of this Article with regard to
Hayes personally, it is important to note that the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in the Hayes Appeal is inconsistent with each of the other
circuits to address the issue.59 Rather, most other circuits are in accord
with the Ball decision relied upon by the district court in Hayes, which
held that a predicate offense under section 922(g)(9) need only have the
element of force and that the domestic relationship may be proven
outside of the statutory elements.60 Moreover, the Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Hayes to effectively resolve this split between the circuits.61 If the
Supreme Court agrees with those circuits that do not require the domestic
relationship to be included as a statutory element of the predicate
offense, the double jeopardy concerns addressed in this Article will be
revived in the Hayes case.
Furthermore, the district court’s decision in Hayes appears
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Shepard and effectively
protects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Thus,
if the Supreme Court reverses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Hayes
Appeal, and holds that the domestic relationship need not be an element
of the predicate offense, the district court’s rationale in Hayes would
likely be adopted in other circuits. Additionally, because the issue
addressed by the Supreme Court is limited to the context of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9), it is unclear what impact the Supreme Court’s decision may
have on the manner of proving predicate offenses generally.
Consequently, the facts presented by Hayes, and the district court’s
ruling regarding the manner in which a predicate offense may be proven,
remain topics for consideration in the debate regarding the proper scope
of proving predicate offenses.62 Moreover, neither Hayes nor Shepard
59

See United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 (10th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Dep’t of Justice, 328
F.3d 1361, 1364–67 (Fed. Cir. 2003); United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, 562 (5th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Barnes, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 87, 295 F.3d 1354, 1358–61
(D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 142–44 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218–21 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619–
21 (8th Cir. 1999).
60
United States v. Ball, 7 F. App’x 210 (4th Cir. 2001), abrogated by United States
v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24,
2008) (No. 07-608); see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Deharo, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1031
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (adopting a similar rationale and following the First, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits).
61
United States v. Hayes, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
62
See Heckenliable, 446 F.3d at 1049; Belless, 338 F.3d at 1067; White, 328 F.3d at
1364–67; Shelton, 325 F.3d at 562; Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1358–61; Kavoukian, 315 F.3d at
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addressed the Fifth Amendment issue of double jeopardy which may
arise from allowing evidence of a prior conviction to be re-litigated at the
guilt phase of a subsequent prosecution. Therefore, the remainder of this
Article addresses the double jeopardy issue that might arise in such a
situation, and predicts how that issue should be resolved. The Article
seeks to accomplish this by providing an overview of double jeopardy
analysis and then applying it to the facts of Hayes in order to exemplify
the potential double jeopardy concerns associated with proving the
existence of a predicate offense.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROVING PREDICATE OFFENSES
A. Double Jeopardy Analysis: An Overview
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, indicates
that no person “shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.”63 Under the Fifth Amendment, the Double
Jeopardy Clause provides three protections: it prevents a second
prosecution of an offense after acquittal, it prevents a second prosecution
after conviction, and it prevents multiple punishments for the same
offense.64 However, the most commonly litigated issue within the Double
Jeopardy Clause is determining what constitutes the “same offense.”
The Supreme Court has stated that the first step in the double
jeopardy analysis is to determine whether the legislature intended that
each violation be considered a separate offense.65 When questions remain
as to the legislative intent, however, the primary analysis for determining
when two proceedings involve the same offense under the Double
Jeopardy Clause is the “same elements” test laid out in Blockburger v.

142–44; Chavez, 204 F.3d at 1313–14; Meade, 175 F.3d at 218–21; Smith, 171 F.3d at
619–21.
63
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977).
64
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); see also Karen J. Ciupak, RICO and the
Predicate Offense: An Analysis of Double Jeopardy and Verdict Consistency Problems,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 382, 393 (1982) (discussing the “three protections afforded by
the double jeopardy clause”).
65
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985); see also Ciupak, supra note 64,
at 390 (“the Blockburger test [i]s a rule of statutory construction, to be used to determine
whether Congress intended to create two offenses or one”).
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United States.66 In essence, the Blockburger test “treats two offenses as
different if and only if each requires an element the other does not.”67
In Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of three counts of
distributing morphine hydrochloride in violation of the Harrison Narcotic
Act.68 On appeal, the defendant argued that two of the convictions under
section 1 and section 2 of the Act, respectively, should be punished as
one offense because both charges involved the same sale to one
individual.69 The Supreme Court responded that “where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not.”70 According to the Court, section 1 of the Act prohibited the
sale of contraband not in its original stamped package, and section 2
prohibited the sale of any such contraband without a proper
prescription.71 Consequently, because each charge under the statute
required proof of an element that the other did not, the single sale made
by the defendant could be prosecuted as two separate offenses.72
In recent years, federal courts have consistently resolved double
jeopardy questions involving similar offenses using Blockburger’s
statutory construction test which is often referred to as simply the “sameelements” test.73 The Supreme Court, however, has wrestled with
expanding double jeopardy analysis to incorporate other tests for
determining if separate offenses constitute the “same offense.”74
Most recently, in Grady v. Corbin, the Supreme Court held that the
Blockburger test does not conclude the double jeopardy analysis.75 In
Grady, the prosecution intended to re-prove the conduct of a defendant’s
66
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696
(1993) (“The same-elements test, sometimes referred to as the ‘Blockburger’ test,
inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they
are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive
prosecution.”).
67
Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L.J. 1807, 1813
(1997).
68
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300.
69
Id. at 300–01.
70
Id. at 304.
71
Id. at 303–04.
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
74
Grady, 495 U.S. 508, 517 (rejecting a “same evidence” test and adopting a “same
conduct” test), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. at 712 (rejecting the “same conduct”
analysis); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985) (rejecting the “same
transaction” test).
75
Grady, 495 U.S. at 516.
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prior conviction in order to rely upon it as the reckless or negligent act
necessary to sustain homicide and assault charges.76 In its decision, the
Court stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense following acquittal or conviction and
also protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.77
Therefore, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause:
bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to
establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted . . . [. And] the
critical inquiry is what conduct the state will prove, not the
evidence that the state will use to prove the conduct (the “Same
Conduct” test).78

Three terms later, however, the dissent in Grady prevailed in United
States v. Dixon, the Court’s most recent decision regarding the
controlling analysis for double jeopardy issues.79
In an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Dixon Court
held that the Grady “same conduct” analysis lacked historical roots and
was unworkable and was therefore overruled.80 In Dixon, the defendant
had previously been convicted of criminal contempt for violating a
conditional release order and was subsequently prosecuted for the
specific act which violated his conditional release.81 The Court held that
the Blockburger test precluded prosecution of the subsequent charge
unless it passed the “same elements” test.82 Consequently, the defendant
could not be prosecuted for the activity that resulted in the contempt
charge unless the subsequent prosecution involved a charge with
differing elements from the contempt charge.83
Because Dixon’s contempt charge required the prosecution to prove
that he committed a violation of the drug laws as the basis for the
violation of his conditional release, the subsequently-charged drug
offense did not have an element that did not have to be proven to sustain
the contempt charge.84 Therefore, both charges qualified as the same
76

Id. at 513–14.
Id. at 514.
78
Id. at 521.
79
Dixon, 509 U.S. at 688 (1993); see also Grady, 495 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
80
Dixon, 509 U.S. at 711.
81
Id. at 691.
82
Id. at 700.
83
Id. at 702.
84
Id.
77
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offense under the “same elements” test and the subsequent prosecution
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.85 As a result, though the outcome
in Dixon would likely have been the same under the “same conduct”
analysis, the Supreme Court reverted back to placing the emphasis in
double jeopardy analysis on the elements of the crime, rather than the
conduct that must be proven.
The Dixon decision, however, did not expressly rule that the
Blockburger “same elements” test was the exclusive test relevant to
double jeopardy analysis.86 Though the Court did hold that the “same
elements” test was the primary analysis, a majority of the Justices could
not define the scope of that analysis.87 Consequently, the Justices’s
inability in Dixon to come to a consensus on the scope of Blockburger
has been a topic of great discussion.88 Some scholars have also argued
that the Blockburger test is not flexible enough to address all double
jeopardy questions.89 In fact, the Supreme Court appears to agree on this
point, and it has provided flexibility in the Blockburger analysis by
allowing a deviation in two unique situations.90
First, in Ashe v. Swenson, the Court held that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel was applicable to the Double Jeopardy Clause and that
a court must rationally protect91 a defendant from having to re-litigate
issues that have already been determined by a valid judgment.92 In Ashe,
85

Id.
Id. at 697–712.
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., Kathryn A. Pamenter, Comment, United States v. Dixon: The Supreme
Court Returns to the Traditional Standard for Double Jeopardy Analysis, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 575, 576–77 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made
Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1813 (1997).
89
See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Against Successive Prosecutions
in Complex Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95, 101 (1992).
90
See generally Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436 (1970).
91
The Court in Ashe stated that:
[T]his approach requires a court to examine the record of the prior
proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and
other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could
have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. The inquiry must be
set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the
circumstances of the proceedings. Any test more technically
restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule
of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case
where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of
acquittal.
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.
92
Id.
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the defendant was acquitted of robbing a particular individual as part of a
robbery that in fact included six victims.93 The Court in Ashe held that
the prior determination that the defendant charged with robbing one of
the victims was not present during the robbery prevented the prosecution
from simply retrying the defendant for the robbery of one of the other six
individuals.94 The opinion stated that the “single rationally conceivable
issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one
of the robbers. And the jury had found that he had not.”95 Therefore, the
second prosecution for the robbery would be wholly impermissible.96
Consequently, it appears the Court will allow a deviation from the
traditional Blockburger analysis in a context where a second prosecution
necessarily re-litigates issues that were resolved in the defendant’s favor
in prior litigation.97
The second variation of the Blockburger test occurred in Harris v.
Oklahoma.98 In Harris, the Court expressly held that “[w]hen . . .
conviction of a greater crime . . . cannot be [held] without conviction of a
lesser crime . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause bars [the] prosecution for
the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one.”99 Harris involved
the greater conviction of felony murder which barred the lesser
conviction of robbery with firearms that was used as the predicate felony
offense.100 In this context, the prosecution necessarily selected an
underlying felony—robbery with firearms—that had to be proven during
the trial as the felony element of the felony murder charge.101
Hence, an attempt to subsequently charge the defendant with the
underlying felony would fail Blockburger because the underlying felony
was incorporated in its entirety into the felony murder charge, and,
therefore, did not contain an element that the felony murder charge did
not.102 It also appears that this deviation parallels the logic stated in Ashe
because the double jeopardy bar is based on the fact that the felony
murder conviction could not be sustained if the jury had not already
conclusively determined that a robbery with firearms had in fact
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Id. at 437.
Id. at 445.
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Id.
See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
433 U.S. 682 (1977).
Id. at 682.
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Id.
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occurred.103 Therefore, the second deviation to Blockburger appears to
apply in the situation where a statutory offense incorporates as an
element a category of offenses, which therefore precludes traditional
Blockburger analysis because the statute does not explicitly incorporate
the elements of a particular offense.104
Consequently, it follows that the most accurate description of the
Supreme Court’s standard for double jeopardy analysis is that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the successive prosecution or punishment for the
same offense.105 Moreover, in determining if two offenses are the same,
the courts will look for clear legislative intent and then will determine if
each offense contains an element distinct from the other.106 Finally, even
if the offenses do have distinct elements, they will be deemed the “same
offense” if the prosecution of the prior offense determinatively litigated
the facts at issue in the subsequent offense.107
Though the Supreme Court appears steadfast in its application of
the analysis discussed above, the legal community is much wearier about
its application.108 Professor Jacqueline E. Ross has pointed out that there
are as many as six different double jeopardy analyses that could be used
in place of Blockburger’s “same elements” standard.109 In fact, scholars
advocate four of those tests as superior to Blockburger.110 Specifically,
these tests include a more rigid “same elements”111 test, a “same act or
transaction”112 test, a “blameworthiness”113 test, and even Grady’s “same
conduct”114 test.

103
See also United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1213 (D. Ala. 1995)
(interpreting Harris to allow a felony prosecution subsequent to a prosecution for felony
murder if it could be shown that the felony charge in the subsequent prosecution was not
the felony that had been used to sustain the felony murder conviction).
104
See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
106
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1932).
107
See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
445 (1970).
108
See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Review Essay: Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1001 (2000) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY,
THE LAW (1998)).
109
Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under Many Headings: The Problem of Multiple
Punishment, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245, 258–66 (2002).
110
Id.
111
Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1813
(1997).
112
Kirstin Pace, Fifth Amendment—The Adoption of the “Same Elements” Test: The
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants From Double Jeopardy, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769 (1994).
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The more rigid “same elements” test is advocated by Professor
Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science at
Yale Law School.115 Professor Amar argues that “same” should mean
“same” under double jeopardy and that a court should not look beyond a
statute to make that determination. In essence, Professor Amar states that
a court should consider legislative intent and the statutory elements in
order to preclude a second prosecution under the Fifth Amendment.116
He also argues that other considerations such as the collateral estoppel
problem addressed in Ashe v. Swenson, could be adequately addressed
under due process analysis.117 Consequently, Professor Amar’s view
most notably differs from Blockburger in that the Double Jeopardy
Clause should not hold lesser or greater offenses to be the “same
offense.”118
The “same act” or “same transaction” test has been proffered by
Kirstin Pace and, among others, Justice William J. Brennan.119 This test
“requires the prosecution, except in the most limited circumstances, to
join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a
single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.”120 It is argued
that this test is the best analysis for double jeopardy questions because it
places proper restraint on the government to prevent harassing litigation,
and ensures finality of adjudication.121 Though the Supreme Court has
squarely rejected the “same act” test, many scholars consider it a viable
substitute for Blockburger’s “same elements” analysis.122
113

George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy
Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
114
Susan R. Klein, Review Essay: Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001
(2000) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW
(1998)).
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Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1813
(1997).
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Id. at 1833.
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Kirstin Pace, Fifth Amendment—The Adoption of the “Same Elements” Test: The
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants From Double Jeopardy, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769 (1994). See also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773
(1985) (rejecting the “same transaction” test); Klein, supra note 114, at 1031 (noting
Justice Brennan’s support of the “same transaction” test).
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CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769, 801 (1994) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
453–54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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Id. at 802.
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The “blameworthiness” test has been promoted by Professor
George C. Thomas of Rutgers University School of Law.123 Professor
Thomas argues that “offenses are the same for double jeopardy analysis
when they manifest a single blameworthiness . . . . [and, often,] courts
must infer whether the legislature intended to impose more than one
conviction for the actor’s conduct.”124 Professor Thomas contends that
this test would relieve what he perceives to be the problem with
Blockburger: sufficiently different descriptions of an offense will allow
for subsequent prosecutions, even if inconsistent with legislative
intent.125
It is evident from the discourse on the appropriate test for double
jeopardy analysis that the future of the Blockburger test is questionable.
Therefore, this Article will briefly address how its conclusion might fare
under these other proposed double jeopardy tests. At this juncture,
however, the Supreme Court has not indicated any departure from
Blockburger’s “same elements” analysis. Consequently, this Article will
focus its analysis of the double jeopardy issue involved with proving a
predicate offense under that Supreme Court standard. In an effort to
provide an example of this analysis, the Article specifically addresses the
issue in the context of United States v. Hayes.
B. The Dual Sovereignty Issue
As a preliminary matter, this section will confront the issue of dual
sovereignty and explain why that doctrine is not controlling in the
context of this Article.
Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty, the Supreme Court has long
held that double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecutions by state
and federal authorities for the same conduct.126 In Abbate v. United
States, the Court discussed the culmination of precedent leading up to
this conclusion, and in doing so, clearly set forth the legal basis for the
doctrine as well as the public policy supporting its application. 127
In Abbate, the Court first mentioned its prior decision in United
States v. Lanza, which set forth the legal framework for dealing with the
constitutional concerns surrounding a federal prosecution following a
123

George C. Thomas, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same
Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
124
Id. at 1027.
125
Id. at 1036.
126
See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 189–96 (1959); see also Ciupak, supra
note 64 (discussing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959)).
127
Abbate, 359 U.S. at 189–96.
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state conviction for the same conduct.128 In Lanza, the act of possessing
liquor was a violation of both state and federal law—with the state
deriving its authority from the police powers reserved by the Tenth
Amendment and the federal law deriving its authority from the
Eighteenth Amendment.129 In permitting successive prosecutions under
each sovereign’s respective laws, the Lanza Court held that where an act
is denounced as a crime by “two sovereignties, deriving power from
different sources, . . . [it is] an offense against the peace and dignity of
both and may be punished by each.”130 Following its acknowledgement
of this principle, the Abbate Court emphasized that the lower federal
courts had consistently read Lanza to hold that “a federal prosecution is
not barred by a prior state prosecution of the same person for the same
acts.”131
Before affirming the lower courts’ interpretation of Lanza,
however, the Abbate Court also addressed the public policy concern
surrounding the principle of dual sovereignty.132 The opinion noted that
the basic dilemma had been recognized for over a century and was based
on the concern that infractions might only minimally affect the interest of
one sovereign while having a much more profound effect on the interests
of another.133 Thus, absent a dual sovereignty limitation on double
jeopardy, a relatively minor infraction of state law with a
correspondingly lenient punishment might preclude the prosecution of
much more serious federal crimes.134
Based on the legal principles set forth by Lanza and the concerns
over equity in enforcement, the Abbate Court firmly held that under the
doctrine of dual sovereignty, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
double jeopardy did not prohibit the federal government from
prosecuting an individual under its laws for acts already prosecuted
under state law.135
Turning now to the topic of this Article, it should first be noted that
in both Abbate and its progeny, the dual sovereignty doctrine has only
been invoked in the context where both sovereigns have actually
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Id. (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
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exercised their authority to prohibit the same form of conduct.136 Thus, it
is clear that the federal prosecution in Hayes does not fit neatly into
settled precedent regarding the dual sovereignty doctrine. More
specifically, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the federal government has
exercised its commerce power to prohibit anyone who has been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from traveling in
interstate commerce with a firearm.137 That statute, however, in no way
criminalizes domestic violence at the federal level.138 Rather, it merely
incorporates a prior conviction of an MCDV as an element to the federal
crime. Thus, the federal government has not exercised its sovereign
authority to create a federal crime of domestic violence which would
invoke the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
This Article argues that the circumstances of the Hayes case
represent, in effect, one sovereign subjecting an individual to the
equivalent of a second prosecution under the laws of another sovereign.
More specifically, the federal law requires the existence of a separate
domestic violence conviction which the federal government does not
have the authority to prosecute. Thus, the presentation of evidence in
relation to the circumstances of the prior conviction constitutes an effort
to prove that the prior conviction should be treated as a domestic
violence conviction, regardless of how the prior conviction is defined by
the convicting sovereign.
The reasoning in this Article stipulates that presenting additional
evidence in such a manner is not necessarily unconstitutional. However,
in cases such as Hayes, where the state has an independent domestic
violence statute that was not used to convict the individual, the federal
government is essentially transforming a conviction under one state law
into a conviction under another. This Article argues that if the manner in
which that evidence is presented would be prohibited in a state court
because of double jeopardy, then the federal government should not be
permitted to circumvent the state system to achieve what would
otherwise be prohibited by the Constitution. In sum, the argument
presented by this Article is that the federal prosecution in Hayes would
have, in effect, twice put the defendant in jeopardy under the laws of a
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See generally Abbate, 359 U.S. at 196; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
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under federal law).
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See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
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single sovereign by transforming a state simple battery conviction into a
state domestic battery conviction.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the applicability of the
dual sovereignty doctrine in the context of predicate offenses. Permitting
the federal government to prove the existence of a predicate offense in
the manner presented above, however, should not fall under the dual
sovereignty doctrine, because it would not be consistent with federal
precedent. More specifically, the application of double jeopardy in this
context would in no way limit a sovereign’s independent authority to
criminalize and prosecute offenses against the “peace and dignity” of the
sovereign.139 Rather, it would simply limit the manner in which a
sovereign could prove the existence of a predicate offense that had been
incorporated from the laws of another sovereign. Moreover, the public
policy of the dual sovereignty doctrine also should not preclude the
application of double jeopardy in this context. Particularly, it should not
be precluded because it would in no way prohibit successive
prosecutions by sovereigns that have chosen, for independent policy
reasons, to actively criminalize the same form of conduct pursuant to
their respective sovereign authority.140
Furthermore, dictum from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartkus
v. Illinois lends support to the foregoing conclusion that the dual
sovereignty doctrine should not be extended to include situations such as
those presented in Hayes.141 In Bartkus, the Court hinted that if a state
prosecution was pursued at the behest of the federal government in an
attempt to avoid the federal double jeopardy prohibition, then the state
prosecution may not be protected by dual sovereignty because it is a
“sham and a cover” for a federal prosecution.142 In fact, the courts of
appeals adopt this language to create an exception to the dual sovereignty
doctrine.143 The exception was aptly described by the District of
Columbia Circuit when it held that “Bartkus, as we view it, stands for the
proposition that federal authorities are proscribed from manipulating
state processes to accomplish that which they cannot constitutionally do
themselves.”144 The court explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would, of
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course, result in a mockery of the dual sovereignty concept that underlies
our system of criminal justice.”145
Though the courts of appeals interpreted Bartkus in reference to
what cannot be accomplished at the federal level due to double jeopardy,
in contrast to Hayes, which deals with what cannot be accomplished at
the federal level due to a lack of jurisdiction, the holdings still represent a
restrictive interpretation of the dual sovereignty doctrine. More
particularly, such an analysis lends support to a conclusion that the
federal government should not be permitted to use the dual sovereignty
doctrine to manipulate the laws of another sovereign in a manner that
would otherwise be prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, in cases like
Hayes, the federal government should not be permitted to exploit the
dual sovereignty doctrine by using it to prove the existence of a state law
conviction which the state itself would not be able to pursue because of
double jeopardy.
Consequently, the principles and precedent surrounding the dual
sovereignty doctrine reveal that there is no clear basis for precluding the
applicability of the double jeopardy doctrine when one sovereign merely
incorporates a predicate offense from another sovereign without
criminalizing the predicate conduct under its own laws. Therefore, this
Article analyzes whether the federal government’s actions in Hayes
would have led to a result that is contrary to the principles of double
jeopardy.
C. Legislative Intent and the Legal Framework of Hayes’ Convictions
Before providing an in-depth analysis of the double jeopardy issue
presented by United States v. Hayes or predicate offenses generally, it is
helpful to examine the legal framework used to charge the defendant
Hayes. It is also necessary to understand the legislative intent of this
framework in order to analyze the Hayes case under double jeopardy
analysis.
In 1996, Congress stated in clear terms that this country would have
“zero tolerance when it comes to guns and domestic violence.”146 In
order to accomplish this mandate, and to strengthen the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”), Congress invoked its commerce
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power147 to amend 18 U.S.C. § 922, making it unlawful for any person
convicted of an MCDV to possess a firearm or ammunition.148
The statute was amended with the sole intent of keeping guns away
from those convicted of domestic violence crimes.149 In doing so, Senator
Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) stated that the existing federal law
preventing felons from possessing firearms was insufficient to keep
firearms out of the hands of those who commit crimes of domestic
violence.150 Senator Lautenberg commented that many times, those guilty
of domestic violence are only charged with a misdemeanor. Therefore,
the senator remarked that an amendment to prevent misdemeanor
domestic violence offenders from possessing firearms was necessary to
protect the lives of wives and children.151
Due to its relatively short life span, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) generated
many unanswered questions regarding the constitutionality of its
application—particularly when the government attempts to equate one
state offense to another in order to satisfy the predicate offense
requirement. In order to fully understand the constitutional implications
of such a practice, it is necessary to look at the legal framework of those
offenses and the legislative intent behind them. Most importantly, in
examining the implications of Hayes, it is necessary to recognize and
compare West Virginia’s separate statutes for the crimes of simple
battery and domestic battery.152
In Hayes, the federal government attempted to satisfy the prior
conviction element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) by alleging that Hayes’ state
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conviction for simple battery was in fact a conviction for an MCDV.153
However, because West Virginia has different statutes for the crimes of
simple battery and domestic battery, an understanding of the legislative
intent behind the creation of these statutes is necessary to analyze the
double jeopardy issue in Hayes.
After a careful review of West Virginia’s domestic violence
statute154 (which includes the charge of “domestic battery”) and its
statute for malicious or unlawful assault, assault, and battery155 (the
“physical violence” statute,” which includes the charge of “simple
battery”), it is apparent that a clear difference exists between the two
statutes. The domestic violence statute specifies that the victim of the
accused must be “his or her family or household member.”156 Of
particular significance, the code also states that no individual may be
prosecuted under both statutes for the same act.157 Therefore, though the
two statutes are very similar, they reflect clear legislative intent to
recognize that a battery committed against someone of a domestic
relationship is different from a battery committed against any other
individual.
Furthermore, when comparing the two statutes with the federal
definition of an MCDV, it is clear that the domestic violence statute in
West Virginia represents the precise offense that was intended to be
incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).158

153
United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
154
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2004); see Appendix for the full text of this provision.
155
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (2004); see Appendix for the full text of this provision.
156
W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-28(a), (b) (2004). See also W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9(b), (c)
(2004).
157
Id. at § 61-2-28(f).
158
See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2000) (defining a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence as:
an offense that (i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal
law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a
person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse,
parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim).
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D. Analyzing Hayes and Proving a Predicate Offense under Double
Jeopardy Analysis
When applying double jeopardy analysis to the issue of proving a
predicate offense as a substantive element of a federal criminal charge,
two situations are possible. First, the prosecution may claim that the state
conviction is literally the “same” as the federally defined predicate
offense. Second, the prosecution may claim that the state conviction is
not literally the “same” as the federally defined predicate offense, but for
some other reason the prior conviction should qualify as the requisite
predicate offense.
In the first scenario, double jeopardy does not become an issue if
the offenses are literally the “same,” because taking judicial notice of
such a fact will not require any information beyond the elements of the
offenses. This does not present a double jeopardy problem, because
taking judicial notice of the record of a prior state conviction at the
federal level would not constitute a second prosecution, since it would
not require the litigation of any disputed fact.159 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has specifically stated that it is “well established that there is no
double jeopardy bar to the use of prior convictions” in the context of
subsequent offenses.160 Therefore, a double jeopardy problem is not
introduced by simply using a prior state conviction as a predicate offense
to a federal crime.
However, when the prior conviction and the predicate offense are
not literally the same act, and the prosecution attempts to re-litigate the
facts of the prior conviction in order to show that it should qualify as the
159

See generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717–18 (1969), overruled
on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (stating that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution following either acquittal or
conviction and “[t]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from
being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it”).
160
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 391 (1994); see also Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S.
673, 676–77 (1895) (stating:
The increased severity of the punishment for the subsequent offence
is not a punishment for the same offence for the second time, but a
severer punishment for the subsequent offence, the law which
imposes the increased punishment being presumed to be known by all
persons, and to deter those so inclined from the further commission
of crime; and we are unable to see how the statute which imposes
such increased punishment violates the provisions of our Constitution
hereinbefore quoted. . . . The fact that the indictment charged a
former conviction of another and entirely different offence, is not in
fact charging him with an offence with respect of the former offence
in the case in hand. The averments as to the former offence go as to
the punishment only).
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predicate offense, the double jeopardy analysis becomes complicated.
This is particularly problematic when the defendant was not convicted
under the state statute that explicitly parallels the federal definition of the
predicate offense. In this scenario, double jeopardy becomes a potential
issue because the prosecution is essentially asserting that being convicted
for one state offense amounts to the equivalent of being convicted for a
separate and distinct state offense. More specifically, the double jeopardy
problem arises when the prosecution wishes to present new evidence
regarding a prior conviction to prove it meets a different criminal
definition. This is a problem under double jeopardy because litigating the
validity of that evidence to attain an increased level of punishment may
amount to prosecuting the prior offense a second time.161
For example, in United States v. Hayes, the prosecution sought to
prove that a prior conviction of simple battery met the federal definition
of an MCDV.162 Moreover, because West Virginia has a specific
domestic battery statute that parallels the federal definition, the federal
government was effectively trying to prove that the defendant’s prior
conviction amounted to a state conviction for an offense other than that
to which he pleaded guilty.163 In order to accomplish this, the prosecution
stated in its indictment that it would present evidence at trial proving that
the prior conviction of simple battery did in fact meet the federal
definition of an MCDV.164 This practice would thus be re-litigating the
circumstances of a prior conviction to achieve an additional degree of
punishment. Therefore, because it is akin to re-prosecuting the facts of
the underlying conviction, the practice raises the issue of double
jeopardy and should invoke the application of the Blockburger “same
elements” test.165
Under the Blockburger test and West Virginia law, the crimes of
domestic battery and simple battery are in fact the “same offense”
because each violation does not require an additional element that the
other does not.166 In fact, the only difference between the two statutes is
161
See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
multiple punishments for the same offense).
162
United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
163
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2006); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2004).
164
Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 540–41.
165
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1931) (stating that a single
act may only be an offense against two statutes if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not).
166
Id.; see also W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004).
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the identity of the victim.167 Moreover, because the federal definition of a
crime of domestic violence parallels West Virginia’s domestic violence
statute, proving the elements of the predicate offense in Hayes would
necessarily involve proving the elements of the state domestic violence
offense. Therefore, re-litigating the facts of Hayes’ simple battery
conviction in order to prove that it was in fact an MCDV would require
the federal government to prove that Hayes had committed the state
offense of domestic battery.
The situation in Hayes closely parallels the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Ohio.168 In Brown, the defendant had been tried for
the crime of joyriding, which required the prosecution to establish that
the defendant took or operated a vehicle without the owner’s consent.169
Subsequently, the prosecution also sought an auto-theft conviction
against the same defendant.170 The auto-theft charge required the
prosecution to prove the same elements as the joyriding offense, but
required the additional element of intent to permanently deprive the
owner of possession.171 In its decision, the Court held that:
as is invariably true of a greater and lesser included offense, the
lesser offense . . . requires no proof beyond that which is required
for conviction of the greater . . . [and] [t]he greater offense is
therefore by definition the “same” for purposes of double
jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it.172

Similarly, under the Court’s holding in Brown, the West Virginia
crime of simple battery is a lesser included offense of domestic battery.
More particularly, domestic battery is statutorily defined as being simple
battery with the additional element of the victim’s domestic relationship
with the defendant.173 Consequently, the Fifth Amendment would clearly
bar a subsequent prosecution under the domestic violence statute
following a prior conviction for the same act under the physical violence
statute. In fact, the West Virginia domestic violence statute appears to
recognize this by stating that an individual cannot be charged under both
the domestic violence statute and the physical violence statute for the
same act.174
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

See W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004).
432 U.S. 161 (1977).
Id. at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
See W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004).
See W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28(f) (2004).
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On the other hand, in Hayes, the prosecution did not seek a
conviction for domestic battery stemming from the simple battery; rather,
the prosecution sought to show that the simple battery met the federal
definition of an MCDV.175 Therefore, it is arguable that equating Hayes’
simple battery conviction to a crime of domestic violence does not
constitute a subsequent prosecution or a form of duplicative punishment
barred by the Fifth Amendment.
In applying the Shepard analysis at the guilt phase, however, the
district court in Hayes held that disputed facts outside the judicial record
of the prior conviction must be submitted to the jury under the Sixth
Amendment.176 This necessarily amounts to requiring the prosecution to
re-litigate the facts of the underlying conviction in order to qualify the
conviction as an MCDV. Thus, the determination of the disputed
contention regarding the victim of the prior conviction clearly constitutes
a trial of the disputed evidence.177 Moreover, this case illustrates that a
state conviction of misdemeanor domestic violence carries a greater
penalty than simple battery in that it restricts the constitutional right to
bear arms at the federal level.178 The state’s decision to not allow an
individual to be prosecuted under both statutes also reflects an
understanding that doing so would be an impermissible form of
duplicative punishment.179
It is also clear that a conviction of domestic battery carries a social
stigma far different from a conviction for simple battery. Therefore, an
attempt to prove the existence of an MCDV conviction with evidence
outside the judicial record of the simple battery conviction would subject
the defendant to the increased level of punishment associated with a
separate state conviction through the re-litigation of the underlying facts

175
United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540, 541 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on
other grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
176
Id. at 542.
177
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (7th ed. 2000) (defining the word “trial” in
the legal context as: “A formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of
legal claims in an adversary proceeding.”).
178
U.S. CONST. amend. II. Though the precise scope of the constitutional right to bear
arms has not been clearly delineated by the Supreme Court, the point remains the same—
qualifying the state conviction as an MCDV will subject the defendant to a form of
punishment above and beyond that which he received for the underlying conviction. See
generally Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (addressing the scope of the
constitutional right to bear arms).
179
See W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004).
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of the prior conviction.180 Consequently, this re-litigation would force the
defendant to “run the gauntlet” of defending the battery accusation a
second time, and should be prohibited as a subsequent prosecution of the
same offense under state law in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.181
Therefore, whether the prosecution claims to be re-litigating a prior
conviction to prove the elements of West Virginia’s domestic battery
statute or to satisfy the federal definition of a crime of domestic violence,
the practice will violate Blockburger’s “same elements test.”182 This
occurs because domestic battery and the federal definition of a crime of
domestic violence both have elements that simple battery does not, and
simple battery does not have any elements other than those included in
both the domestic battery statute and the federal definition.183 Therefore,
in the context of cases such as Hayes, the use of evidence outside the
judicial record of the prior conviction will fail the Blockburger “same
elements” test to run afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
double jeopardy.
Furthermore, this conclusion appears to be equally supported by the
other double jeopardy tests proposed by legal scholars. Under the
overturned “same conduct” standard promoted by Professor Susan R.
Klein, a second prosecution would violate double jeopardy if “the
government, to establish an essential element of an offense . . . [will]
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant ha[s]
already been prosecuted.”184 In Hayes, any attempt to prove the victim of
the battery would require the government to reprove the conduct that
180

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense).
181
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970) (citing Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 190 (1957)) (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause “surely protects a man
who has been acquitted from having to ‘run the gauntlet’ a second time.”); see also North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717–18 (1969) (the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
against a second prosecution following either acquittal or conviction and “[t]he
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for
the same offence as from being twice tried for it”); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 304 (1931) (stating that a single act may only be an offense against two statutes
if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not).
182
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1931) (stating that a single
act may only be an offense against two statutes if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not).
183
See W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2006).
184
Susan R. Klein, Review Essay: Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001,
1011 (2000) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE
LAW (1998)).
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constituted the simple battery conviction. Therefore, the “same conduct”
standard would clearly bar a re-litigation of the underlying facts of
Hayes’ conviction.
Under the “same transaction” test advocated by Justice Brennan and
others, double jeopardy is prevented by not allowing a second
prosecution for an offense that arose out of the same conduct, episode, or
transaction of the prior offense.185 In Hayes, the context of Hayes’ prior
conviction is admittedly one occurrence of violence, and would clearly
represent only a single transaction.186 Therefore, a re-litigation of the
circumstances of the simple battery conviction would be prohibited, as it
would be under the “same conduct” test.
Under the rigid “same elements” test endorsed by Professor Akhil
Reed Amar, a court should not look beyond legislative intent and the
statutory elements of offenses in evaluating double jeopardy concerns.187
Thus, in Hayes, the double jeopardy issue would still exist because the
domestic violence statute clearly sets forth legislative intent to not allow
successive prosecutions for simple battery and domestic battery.188
Finally, under the “blameworthiness” test advocated by Professor
George C. Thomas III, double jeopardy would prevent a second
prosecution if the legislature did not intend that a defendant could be
prosecuted under both statutes because the act represented a single
blameworthy act.189 Again, a situation similar to Hayes would present a
double jeopardy problem because the West Virginia legislature has
clearly stated that a defendant cannot be prosecuted for both simple
battery and domestic battery as the result of a single act.190
Consequently, the Hayes decision provides a clear example of how
the manner in which a predicate offense is proven has the potential to
raise serious questions regarding double jeopardy. Any federal statute
that contains a predicate offense as an element will always require that
the state conviction meet the federal definition. Moreover, any attempt to
prove the elements of the federal definition with evidence outside the
judicial record of the prior conviction will require a re-litigation of
185

Id. at 1031 (noting Justice Brennan’s support of the “same transaction” test).
United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
187
Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1833
(1997).
188
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28(d)–(f) (2004).
189
George C. Thomas, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same
Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
190
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28(d)–(f) (2004).
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disputed facts from the prior conviction. Therefore, federal courts must
apply a double jeopardy analysis to any attempt by the prosecution to use
evidence outside the judicial record of a prior conviction to prove the
existence of a predicate offense.
IV. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to double jeopardy, proving the existence of a predicate
offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution may raise other constitutional
issues as well. Thus, even if a court finds that proving the predicate
offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause, further analysis should be performed before allowing
the re-litigation of the prior conviction. More specifically, the
circumstances of such a practice may raise issues of a defendant’s right
to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and state sovereignty under
the Tenth Amendment.191 These issues are likely to be much more casespecific, however, because they are not subject to any uniform statutory
analysis. Therefore, this section only intends to recognize the existence
of these concerns and how they appeared in the context of United States
v. Hayes.
In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court set forth the controlling
standard of review regarding constitutional challenges regarding the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.192 In Barker, the Court held that
speedy trial questions require a court to use a balancing test on a case-bycase basis. In balancing the competing interests, a court should consider
the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion
of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.”193 In Hayes, the elevenyear span between the simple battery conviction and the potential
proceeding to revisit the identity of the victim clearly raises concerns
with regard to the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.194 Most particularly,
such a lapse of time would clearly seem to inhibit the defendant’s ability
to establish any potential defense to the subsequent charge. Similarly,
any case that attempts to prove a predicate offense at the guilt phase of a
subsequent proceeding will likely generate similar questions surrounding
the length of delay between the proceedings and the resulting prejudice
caused to the defendant.
191

U.S. CONST. amends. VI, X.
407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
Id. at 530.
194
United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608).
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In addition, an attempt by the federal government to prove a
predicate offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution also raises Tenth
Amendment issues regarding state sovereignty. In interpreting the Tenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has stated that “federal legislation
threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their
own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a
way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power. . . .”195
Consequently, any Tenth Amendment analysis in regard to proving the
existence of a predicate offense will necessarily be case-specific.
However, in any case where the federal government is attempting to relitigate the circumstances of a state conviction, there is a risk that the
state’s interests may be impeded. For example, if the prior conviction
was the result of a plea agreement, the federal government’s attempt to
equate that offense to another would seem to circumvent a state’s
deliberate exercise of its police powers. Therefore, in cases such as
Hayes, the court should closely examine the circumstances of the prior
conviction to ensure that the re-litigation of the underlying facts of that
conviction will not violate the Tenth Amendment.
It is clear that the manner for proving the existence of a predicate
offense has the potential to raise questions under both the Sixth
Amendment and the Tenth Amendment. Consequently, if a court
concludes that proving a predicate offense with evidence outside the
judicial record of a prior conviction does not violate the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy, it must also perform a
careful analysis of the facts to determine if the Sixth Amendment or
Tenth Amendment should prohibit the practice.
V. CONCLUSION
At this time, it is unclear how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hayes will affect the foregoing analysis. If the Court agrees with those
circuits holding that a prior conviction need not have a domestic
relationship element in order to qualify as an MCDV, the double
jeopardy issue in Hayes will resurface. If the Court affirms the decision
of the Fourth Circuit, the issue of double jeopardy will be removed from
the context of 18 U.S.C. § 922. However, the issue of double jeopardy
will remain in any context where a court allows the prosecution to prove
the existence of a predicate offense with evidence outside the judicial
record of the prior conviction. Therefore, to protect a defendant’s rights
under the Fifth Amendment, if a court cannot constitutionally take
195

Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004).
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judicial notice of a predicate offense, it must invoke a double jeopardy
analysis before allowing the prosecution to relitigate the circumstances
of the prior conviction.
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APPENDIX
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2004):
Domestic violence—Criminal acts: (a) Domestic battery.—Any
person who unlawfully and intentionally makes physical contact of an
insulting or provoking nature with his or her family or household
member or unlawfully and intentionally causes physical harm to his or
her family or household member, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be confined in a county or regional jail for not
more than twelve months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars, or
both. (b) Domestic assault.—Any person who unlawfully attempts to
commit a violent injury against his or her family or household member or
unlawfully commits an act which places his or her family or household
member in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent
injury, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
confined in a county or regional jail for not more than six months, or
fined not more than one hundred dollars, or both. (c) Second offense.—
Domestic Assault or Domestic Battery. A person convicted of a violation
of subsection (a) of this section after having been previously convicted of
a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section, after having been
convicted of a violation of subsection (b) or (c), section nine of this
article where the victim was his or her current or former spouse, current
or former sexual or intimate partner, person with whom the defendant
has a child in common, person with whom the defendant cohabits or has
cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or ward or a
member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense or who
has previously been granted a period of pretrial diversion pursuant to
section twenty-two, article eleven of this chapter for a violation of
subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or a violation of subsection (b) or (c),
section nine of this article where the victim was a current or former
spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner, person with whom
the defendant has a child in common, person with whom the defendant
cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or
ward or a member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense
is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
confined in a county or regional jail for not less than sixty days nor more
than one year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both. A
person convicted of a violation of subsection (b) of this section after
having been previously convicted of a violation of subsection (a) or (b)
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of this section, after having been convicted of a violation of subsection
(b) or (c), section nine of this article where the victim was a current or
former spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner, person with
whom the defendant has a child in common, person with whom the
defendant cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the
defendant’s child or ward or a member of the defendant’s household at
the time of the offense or having previously been granted a period of
pretrial diversion pursuant to section twenty-two, article eleven of this
chapter for a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section or
subsection (b) or (c), section nine of this article where the victim was a
current or former spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner,
person with whom the defendant has a child in common, person with
whom the defendant cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the
defendant’s child or ward or a member of the defendant’s household at
the time of the offense shall be confined in a county or regional jail for
not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or fined not more than
five hundred dollars, or both. (d) Any person who has been convicted of
a third or subsequent violation of the provisions of subsection (a) or (b)
of this section, a third or subsequent violation of the provisions of section
nine of this article where the victim was a current or former spouse,
current or former sexual or intimate partner, person with whom the
defendant has a child in common, person with whom the defendant
cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or
ward or a member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense
or who has previously been granted a period of pretrial diversion
pursuant to section twenty-two, article eleven of this chapter for a
violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section or a violation of the
provisions of section nine of this article in which the victim was a current
or former spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner, person
with whom the defendant has a child in common, person with whom the
defendant cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the
defendant’s child or ward or a member of the defendant’s household at
the time of the offense, or any combination of convictions or diversions
for these offenses, is guilty of a felony if the offense occurs within ten
years of a prior conviction of any of these offenses and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be confined in a state correctional facility not less than one
nor more than five years or fined not more than two thousand five
hundred dollars, or both. (e) As used in this section, “family or
household member” means “family or household member” as defined in
48-27-204 of this code. (f) A person charged with a violation of this
section may not also be charged with a violation of subsection (b) or (c),
section nine of this article for the same act. (g) No law-enforcement
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officer may be subject to any civil or criminal action for false arrest or
unlawful detention for effecting an arrest pursuant to this section or
pursuant to 48-27-1002 of this code.
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (2004):
Malicious or unlawful assault; assault; battery; penalties: (a) If any
person maliciously shoot, stab, cut or wound any person, or by any
means cause him bodily injury with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or
kill, he shall, except where it is otherwise provided, be guilty of a felony
and, upon conviction, shall be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years. If such act be
done unlawfully, but not maliciously, with the intent aforesaid, the
offender shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall, in the
discretion of the court, either be confined in the penitentiary not less than
one nor more than five years, or be confined in jail not exceeding twelve
months and fined not exceeding five hundred dollars. (b) Assault.—If
any person unlawfully attempts to commit a violent injury to the person
of another or unlawfully commits an act which places another in
reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be confined
in jail for not more than six months, or fined not more than one hundred
dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment. (c) Battery.—If any person
unlawfully and intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or
provoking nature with the person of another or unlawfully and
intentionally causes physical harm to another person, he shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be confined in jail for not
more than twelve months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars, or
both such fine and imprisonment. (d) Any person convicted of a violation
of subsection (b) or (c) of this section who has, in the ten years prior to
said conviction, been convicted of a violation of either subsection (b) or
(c) of this section where the victim was a current or former spouse,
current or former sexual or intimate partner, a person with whom the
defendant has a child in common, a person with whom the defendant
cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or
ward or a member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense
or convicted of a violation of section twenty-eight of this article or has
served a period of pretrial diversion for an alleged violation of subsection
(b) or (c) of this section or section twenty-eight of this article when the
victim has such present or past relationship shall upon conviction be
subject to the penalties set forth in section twenty-eight of this article for
a second, third or subsequent criminal act of domestic violence offense,
as appropriate.

